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OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: RECONCILING THE JURY
TRIAL RIGHT AND JUDICIAL CONVENIENCE-Parklane Hosiery Co.,
Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
INTRODUCTION

The interplay of collateral estoppel and the right to a jury trial involves a clash between judicial convenience and constitutional rights.'
Collateral estoppel has long been an effective tool in guarding against
inconsistent rulings 2 and in eliminating expensive and useless
litigation. 3 The clash between judicial convenience and the right to a
jury trial occurs when a party attempts to use collateral estoppel to
prevent litigation of a particular issue although the opposing party has
not had an opportunity to try that issue before a jury. The underlying
question is whether the procedural technique of collateral estoppel can
4
be employed to deprive a party of his seventh amendment right to a
jury trial.
The interaction between judicial convenience and the right to a
jury trial was not well-defined in the evolution of common law.
Tradiestoppel
collateral
of
use
tionally, courts have favored the defensive
5
for the purpose of judicial economy. Defensive collateral estoppel is
employed by a defendant to prevent a plaintiff from retrying issues
which he has already litigated in another action. Offensive collateral
estoppel occurs when a plaintiff prevents a defendant from litigating
previously litigated issues. Although offensive collateral estoppel has
and
often been criticized, a rapidly growing trend now exists allowing
6
estoppel.
collateral
of
use
offensive
the
encouraging
even
7
In ParklaneHosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, the Supreme Court of the
1. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
2. See Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807,
122 P.2d 892 (1942).
3. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965); Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720
(1944).
4. "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy exceeds twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . ... " U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
5. A good analysis of the offensive and defensive uses of collateral estoppel may

be found in Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral
Estoppel by a Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1010 (1967).
6. Offensive collateral estoppel was not favored in Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J.
Super. 560, 213 A.2d 26 (1965), and Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327
P.2d 111 (1958). Other courts have allowed the use of offensive collateral estoppel.
See, e.g., United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. & D.
Nev. 1962).
7. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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United States examined whether a party may use offensive collateral
estoppel to prevent the relitigation of previously resolved issues of fact,
and whether such use would violate a defendant's seventh amendment
right to a jury trial. The Court concluded that the proper use of offensive collateral estoppel does not violate the defendant's right to a jury
trial. Broad discretion in determining whether to allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel in a particular case, however, was left in the
hands of the trial court.
FACTS OF THE CASE
Leo Shore filed a class action suit against Parklane Hosiery Co.,
Inc. in the District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that the defendant had violated certain sections of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.1 The complaint stated that the defendant had
issued a materially false and misleading proxy statement concerning a
merger. The plaintiff sought damages and recision of the merger.
Before the suit came to trial, however, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) filed suit against the same defendant seeking injunctive relief. The action basically alleged the same complaint of the
issuance of a materially false and misleading proxy statement. The
SEC action resulted in a finding that the proxy statement was materially false and misleading, and a declaratory judgment was granted in
favor of the SEC. That judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.9
Shore, the plaintiff in the first action, then claimed that, because
of the ruling against Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., in the SEC action,
the defendant was collaterally estopped from relitigating the falsity of
the proxy statement in Shore's class action. The plaintiff moved for a
partial summary judgment. The district court denied the motion
holding that the defendant had a seventh amendment right to a jury
trial on the character of the proxy statement. The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, 10 holding that because the defendant had
a fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the prior nonjury trial, he
was collaterally estopped from later having the same issues of fact
resolved at a jury trial. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari because of an intercircuit conflict."
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(a), 78t(a) (1976).
9. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir. 1977).
10. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd, 439
U.S. 322 (1979).
11. A decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Rachal v. Hill, 435
F.2d 59 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1970), was in direct conflict with the
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. Rachal, however, has undergone
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DECISION OF THE COURT

The Court concluded that it may be proper for a plaintiff to use
collateral estoppel offensively. While the final decision lies in the
discretion of the trial court some guidelines were established. The
Court developed a two-pronged test to the effect that offensive collateral estoppel should not be allowed when either the plaintiff could
have easily joined in the previous action, or the court determines that
the estoppel would be unfair to the defendant. In the present case, the
plaintiff could not have joined in the previous action because such
joinder was prohibited by statute.' 2 Furthermore, the application of
offensive collateral estoppel was not unfair to the defendant. The
Court determined that the defendant had every opportunity to fully
and fairly litigate the proxy statement issue in the previous action and
that there would be no procedural differences in the second action,
such as a change in venue, which would likely produce a different out-

come.
In expanding on the two-pronged test, the Court examined the two
basic differences between offensive and defensive collateral estoppel.
First, offensive collateral estoppel is not as effective as defensive collateral estoppel in promoting judicial economy. Oftentimes, a party
can adopt a "wait and see" attitude in regard to a prior proceeding.
He might then take advantage of a favorable judgment without being
involved in the initial suit.' 3 Thus, such party is not motivated to join
in the initial suit but can wait and bring his own suit at a later time.
Secondly, it may be unfair to require that a defendant, who for various
reasons does not vigorously defend the first suit, acquiesce in the second action without an effective day in court.1 4
The Court examined collateral estoppel in light of the doctrine of
mutuality of parties. Under the mutuality doctrine, collateral estoppel
could only be used against a party when both parties in the suit were
bound by the prior judgment. Prior to 1971, the doctrine of mutuality
of parties limited the use of collateral estoppel to the parties involved
in the initial action.'" Thus, a party could litigate and lose certain
strong criticism in recent years. See, e.g., Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury
Trials in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 448-49
(1971).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g) (1976).
13. See, e.g., Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327 P.2d 111,
115 (1958); Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965).
14. See note 3 supra.
15. See, e.g., Buckeye Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co., 248
U.S. 55 (1918); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111
(1912); RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942).
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issues in one action and yet be allowed to relitigate the same issues in a
subsequent action if a new party was involved.
Because of strong criticisms, however, the doctrine of mutuality of
parties vis4-vis defensive collateral estoppel was abandoned by the
Supreme Court in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of
Illinois Foundation.'6 The Court concluded that, in an instance of
defensive collateral estoppel, the controlling safeguard should be
whether the estopped party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in
the previous action17 rather than requiring mutuality of parties.
The Court in Shore then held that the proper use of offensive collateral estoppel does not violate the right to a jury trial. The Court examined the "historical approach" in connection with the seventh
amendment. 8 The "historical approach" essentially means that the
basic purpose of the seventh amendment was to retain the jury trial
right in circumstances in which the right would have existed in 1791.19
In 1791, mutuality of parties had to exist in order for a court to allow
collateral estoppel. Relying on the "historical approach," the defendant claimed that, because the mutuality doctrine is no longer viable,
the use of collateral estoppel is no longer proper.
The Court reasoned that to hold as the defendant argued would be
too rigid an interpretation of the seventh amendment. Procedural
changes in the law do not change the intrinsic substantive bases of the
seventh amendment. 2" The Court used several cases as precedent to
show that, at common law, there was no right to a jury trial when the
facts had been previously determined in an equitable action. 2 ' Thus,
even though there could be no collateral estoppel without mutuality in
1791, the Court concluded that the defendant's basic seventh amend16.

402 U.S. 313 (1971). In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc., the Court aban-

doned the concept of mutuality of parties with respect to defensive collateral estoppel
as applied to a matter of patent invalidity. But the Court recognized that factors such
as crowded dockets might necessitate that a party not be given more than one opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the same issue.
17. "Permitting repeated litigation ... as long as the supply of unrelated defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or 'a lack of discipline and
of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy or wise basis for
fashioning rules of procedure."' Id. at 329 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two
Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952)).
18.

See note 4 supra.

19. Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974).
20. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390-92 (1943). In Galloway, a party
argued that a directed verdict was unconstitutional under the seventh amendment. The
Court disagreed, holding that only the most fundamental elements of the jury trial
right need be preserved.
21. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/11
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ment right to a jury trial would not be violated today by allowing the
use of collateral estoppel without requiring mutuality.
In his lone dissent, Justice Rehnquist contended that the defendant
was denied his right to a jury trial. Relying on Dimick v. Schiedt,2
Rehnquist argued that "[tlo hold otherwise is to rewrite the Seventh
Amendment so that a party is guaranteed a jury trial in civil cases
23
unless this Court thinks that a jury trial would be inappropriate.
ANALYSIS

The Clash and Possible Solutions

A.

The Court in Shore rightly concluded that the clash between
judicial convenience and the right to a jury trial could be resolved in
favor of judicial economy in certain circumstances. The task becomes
one of reconciling the common law device of collateral estoppel with
the constitutional right of a jury trial. Traditionally, when there was a
clash between judicial efficiency and a constitutional right, the constitutional right predominated. 2 The defendant in Shore argued that
the prevailing trend in common law was to no longer require the
mutuality doctrine as a prerequisite to the use of collateral estoppel.2"
He argued that this common law trend should give way to the right to
a jury trial because a constitutional right should predominate over a
trend in the common law. The defendant relied on Dimick v. Schiedt2 6
where the Court held that to allow collateral estoppel and thereby deny
the plaintiff his right to a jury trial would, in effect, change the constitution.27 The Court in Shore, however, reasoned persuasively that
22.

293 U.S. 474 (1935). In Dimick, the Court examined whether a plaintiff in a

personal injury case was entitled to a new jury determination of damages under the
seventh amendment when the first determination was inadequate. The plaintiff refused
to accept an award increased by the court. The Court held that even if the defendant
had accepted the judge's compromise, the plaintiff was still entitled to a new trial to
determine proper damages. The right to trial by jury was sufficient to override the consideration of judicial convenience.
23.

Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 348 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,

dissenting).
24.

See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).

25.

The mutuality requirement began to decline in 1942. Bernhard v. Bank of

America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).

26. 293 U.S. 474 (1935). See note 22 supra.
27. The Court wrote:
It is said that the common law is susceptible of growth and adaptation to new circumstances and situations, and that the courts have power to declare and effectuate what is the present rule in respect of a given subject without regard to the
old rule; and some attempt is made to apply that principle here. The common law
is not immutable, but flexible, and upon its own principles adapts itself to varying
conditions. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371 [1933]. But here, we are dealing
with a constitutional provision which has in effect adopted the rules of the com-
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the defendant had misplaced his reliance on Dimick. The Court noted
that Dimick was more concerned with the second clause28 of the
seventh amendment whereas Shore dealt with the first clause29 of the
seventh amendment. Thus, the Court could distinguish Dimick from
Shore by correctly pointing to that difference. 30
Several arguments exist favoring the Court's holding in Shore. One
of the benefits of collateral estoppel is that it guards against inconsistent rulings. 3 ' Another positive effect of collateral estoppel is that it
eliminates expensive and useless litigation. 2 The Shore Court agreed
with the circuit court that Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. had fully and
fairly litigated the false proxy statement issue in a prior proceeding;
thus, there were no genuine issues of material fact remaining to be
litigated, a necessary condition for application of the seventh amendment.33 To allow a jury in the present case "would violate basic principles of fairness, finality, certainty, economy in utilization of judicial
resources, avoidance of possibly inconsistent results, and achievement
of the 'just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action'." 3' 4
The reasoning of the Shore Court was in agreement with other
decisions that the use of offensive collateral estoppel is justified by certain considerations of justice and equity.3" A court must weigh all the
facts to arrive at a fair conclusion. For example, a private
shareholders' action is often foreseeable after there has been a prior
SEC suit.3 6 Thus, the defendant is never really placed in an unfair position because he has been put on guard to litigate the first action to the
best of his ability. The Court recognized that Parklane Hosiery Co.,
Inc. was aware of a pending action by Shore and thus one could conmon law, in respect of trial by jury, as these rules existed in 1791. To effectuate
any change in these rules is not to deal with the common law, qua common law,
but to alter the Constitution.
293 U.S. at 487.
28. "[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII.
29. See note 4 supra.
30. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 n.23 (1979).
31. Note, Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820
(1952).
32. Id.
33. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 565 F.2d 815, 819 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd,
439 U.S. 322 (1979).
34. Id. at 821 (footnotes omitted) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
35. "[N]o one set of facts, no one collection of words or phrases, will provide an
automatic formula for proper rulings on estoppel pleas. In the end, decision will
necessarily rest on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity." Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 333-34 (1971).
36. Comment, The Effect of SEC Injunctions in Subsequent Private Damage Actions-Rachal v. Hill, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1329, 1338-39 (1971).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol5/iss1/11
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clude that the company would vigorously defend the SEC suit. It is
possible, that in a case similar to Shore, the defendant will only seek a
jury trial in the second suit because he realizes that collateral estoppel
will then be at issue. Indeed, a jury trial in the second action would
probably not be advantageous to the normal defendant in a securities
action because, as a practical matter, the sympathy of a jury would
tend to be with aggrieved shareholders rather than with a large corporation."
One could argue, as did Justice Rehnquist in dissent, that the majority opinion in Shore essentially deprives the defendant of a jury
trial. Justice Rehnquist could not accept that the denial of something
as important as a jury trial could be explained as merely a procedural
incident. Trial by jury adds a strong sense of legitimacy to the
American system. Jury trials infuse the certitude, fairness, and common sense of the community into the legal environment. 38 There is a
strong "public policy in favor of jury trials growing out of the Seventh
' Thus, public policy may dictate choosing a jury trial
Amendment." 39
over judicial convenience. Indeed, the Court in Dimick v. Schiedt"
held that the "right of trial by jury is one of ancient origin,
characterized by Blackstone as 'the glory of English law' and 'the most
transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy'." 4
The Shore Court reasoned that as long as there were no procedural
changes in the second suit against Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. then collateral estoppel could be used."2 One could reasonably argue that the
right to a jury trial is a procedural question, and that it would be unfair to deprive the defendant of a jury under the Court's own test. The
Court did not explain what procedural changes would limit the use of
collateral estoppel. This part of the Court's two-prong test is vague,
and the Court should have elaborated exactly what it meant in generally referring to procedural changes. The only explanation the Court offered was a footnote in which the Court stated that "the presence or
absence of a jury as factfinder is basically neutral, quite unlike, for example, the necessity of defending the first lawsuit in an inconvenient
forum."4 3 The Court's footnote did not adequately address the issue.
It is difficult to conceive that an inconvenient forum can be classified
as a procedural difference, prohibiting application of collateral estop37. Note, Collateral Estoppel and the Right to a Jury Trial, 57 NEB. L. REV. 863,
873 (1978).
38. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 498 (1966).

39. McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 393 F. Supp. 256, 259 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
40. 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
41. Id. at.485 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 379).
42. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979).
332 n.19. 1980
43. Id.
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pel, but that the intrinsic right to a jury trial is "basically neutral."
The Court has drawn a subtle distinction without fully explaining its
reasoning.
The Shore Court also reasoned that a purpose behind collateral
estoppel is to save time because the plaintiff will not have to prove
questions of fact that have already been litigated. But the time saved
by avoiding a new trial may be lost by the time required to determine
whether or not to allow collateral estoppel. The focus of the issues
merely changes. An entirely new trial may be necessary to determine
whether the first trial was fairly and fully litigated. Also, time may be
judgments to
wasted if the defendant has to appeal small acceptable
44
litigation.
later
in
estopped
avoid being collaterally
The question arises as to whether the Shore Court chose a fair and
proper test. There are several possible solutions to the clash between
judicial convenience and the constitutional right to a jury trial that the
Court could have used. The first one, which was correctly chosen by
the Court in Shore, is not to allow collateral estoppel in the second action if the plaintiff could have joined in the first suit.4 5 Another solution would be to use an advisory jury in the first action4 , to preserve
the party's seventh amendment right in the second action. This solution, however, has been strongly criticized because an advisory jury
does not satisfy the constitutional right to a jury, and there is no
authority for a judge to delegate his powers to such a panel.4 7 The
Court, therefore, acted responsibly in not using an advisory jury as
part of the test. One final solution would be to use factual determinations in the prior SEC case as prima facie evidence in the later action,
preserving the right to a jury trial by allowing such evidence to be
rebutted.4 8 This solution also has problems because it negates the role
of collateral estoppel in allowing for a second trial. The purpose of
collateral estoppel is to eliminate the need for a second trial on the
same issues. This last solution does not eliminate the need for a second
trial; it merely makes the issues therein easier to prove.
B.

Shore and the "Historical Approach"
The Court in Shore has taken steps to weaken the influence of the

44. Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 767, 327 P.2d 111, 115 (1958).
45. The first suit referred to here was the first case to be decided. Shore involved
a unique fact situation in that the first suit brought against Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc.
was not the first suit decided.
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c).

47.

SEC v. Wills, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)

96,321

(D.D.C. Feb. 11, 1978).
48. McCook v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 393 F. Supp. 256, 259-60 (C.D. Cal.
1975).
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"historical approach" on modern courts. The "historical approach"
involves an interpretation of the federal constitutional guarantee that,
"[in Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved." 9 Courts
have determined that the word "preserve" means that a jury trial must
be granted in a particular situation if the right to a jury trial existed in
such a situation in 1791, the year of the ratification of the seventh
amendment. 5" For example, if one had a right to a jury trial in 1791 in
a breach of contract action, then he would have a constitutional right
to insist upon a jury trial in a similar contract dispute today.'
The Shore Court relied on recent developments in the common law
which have limited the effect of the "historical approach." For example, in Colgrove v. Battin,5 2 the Court deviated from the "historical
approach" because the matter did not directly concern a substantive
issue, but was a procedural incident or detail. 5 3 New techniques must
sometimes be used in a flexible legal system to preserve well-established
notions of fairness. Indeed, one court has gone so far as to declare that
following the letter of the "historical approach" "is often a tenuous
procedure at best." 5 ' There no longer exists the need to "freeze the
jury trial at its 1791 level." 5 5 One cannot expect the writers of the
seventh amendment to have anticipated all the legal and social changes
in the evolution of two hundred years of law.
Shore limits the importance of the "historical approach" in actions involving collateral estoppel, making it less necessary to engage in
a 1791 analysis. Thus, courts can more readily look to current trends in
the law to determine whether a jury trial is warranted at any particular
time or under any particular circumstance. The case is significant in
that it allows for the evolution of certain procedural interpretations in
the law.
CONCLUSION
Shore provides trial courts with a definitive test for determining
when offensive collateral estoppel may fairly be used to achieve
49. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; See notes 18-19 and accompanying text supra.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293
U.S. 474 (1935); Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. 433 (1830).
51. For more background information, see generally F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE
§ 11.9 (1965); IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 10.441, at 3771-74 (2d ed. 1974).
52. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
53. Id. at 156 (citing Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 390 (1943)).
54. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc., 565 F.2d 815, 822 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'd,
439 U.S. 322 (1979).

55. Id.
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judicial economy. Offensive collateral estoppel, as well as defensive
use, is now permissible when the plaintiff could not have easily joined
in the previous action and when the court determines that the estoppel
would not be unfair to the defendant. The case represents an evolution
from strict construction to a more flexible interpretation of the constitution. By allowing the plaintiff, Shore, to collaterally estop
Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. with respect to an essential factual element
of Shore's case, the Shore decision has, in effect, signalled the death
knell for the doctrine of mutuality of parties and weakened strict
reliance on the traditional "historical approach" to the seventh
amendment. What Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. 6 did to the
mutuality doctrine and defensive collateral estoppel, Shore has carried
over to offensive collateral estoppel. Thus, the doctrine of mutuality
of parties now has little significance in the common law regarding offensive or defensive collateral estoppel.
Another implication of Shore is that the power of the SEC will be
increased. The SEC will have greater leverage over violators because
defendants will realize that a settlement will be more advantageous to
them than a judgment. Collateral estoppel cannot be used with a settlement whereas it can be utilized after a court decision. The bargaining
power of the SEC to induce a settlement will be increased.
The Shore Court holds that there is no violation of the seventh
amendment if offensive collateral estoppel is allowed where the issues
have been fully and fairly litigated in a previous equitable action.
While the clash between judicial convenience and the right to a jury
trial still exists, the Court has promulgated guidelines to achieve the
maximum fairness to the defendant while allowing the plaintiff to take
advantage of a previous favorable action. Thus, the ruling in Shore
stands as a landmark decision in the proper use of offensive collateral
estoppel.
DouglasA. Smoot
56.

See note 16 supra.
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